

The Psychological Barriers to Performance Management: Or Why Isn't Everyone Jumping on the Performance-Management Bandwagon?

Author(s): Robert D. Behn

Source: *Public Performance & Management Review*, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Sep., 2002), pp. 5-25

Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.

Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3381295>

Accessed: 08-08-2016 14:05 UTC

---

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at

<http://about.jstor.org/terms>

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [support@jstor.org](mailto:support@jstor.org).



*Taylor & Francis, Ltd.* is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *Public Performance & Management Review*

# THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BARRIERS TO PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT

## Or Why Isn't Everyone Jumping on the Performance-Management Bandwagon?

ROBERT D. BEHN  
*Harvard University*

Everyone is in favor of performance management.<sup>1</sup> Just ask them: "Are you in favor of improving the performance of government?" Do you know anyone who thinks improving the performance of public agencies is truly a bad idea?<sup>2</sup>

Indeed, the formal institutions of American government, as well as the informal ones, are all in favor of performance management. The United States Congress (the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993) and the General Accounting Office (Stevens & Steinhoff, 1998) favor performance management. The National Academy of Public Administration (Popovitch, 1998), the International City/County Management Association (Ammons, 1995), and the Urban Institute (Liner et al., 2001) all love performance management.

Performance management goes by many names, is defined in a variety of ways, and includes an array of concepts. It has been called results-driven government, performance-based management, governing for results, performance-based budgeting, outcome-oriented management, reinventing government, the new public management, the new managerialism, and marketization (Aucoin, 1995; Kettl, 1997, 2000; Peters, 1996). It includes, for example, the ideas espoused by Osborne and Gaebler (1992) in *Reinventing Government*, by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's Financial Management Initiative and her Next Steps agencies, by Vice President Gore's (1993) National Performance Review, and now by President Bush's Management Agenda (Office of Management and Budget, 2001).

Performance management covers a variety of concepts from performance measurement (Swindell & Kelly, 2000; Thompson, 2000), to performance budgeting (Berry, Brower, & Flowers, 2000; Hendrick, 2000), to performance contracting (Behn & Kant, 1999; Byrnes & Freeman, 1999; Clary, Ebersten, & Harlor, 2000), to performance pay (Bacciocco, 1990; Eisenberg & Ingraham, 1993; Grote, 2000; Marshall, 1998). Little wonder that Barton Wechsler and Bruce Clary (2000) of the University of

---

*Author's Note.* I thank Tom Christensen, Steven Kelman, Donald Kettl, Jae Moon, James Perry, Malcolm Sparrow, James Thompson, and three anonymous referees for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this article. None of them, of course, is responsible for any of the failures of my performance.

*Public Performance & Management Review*, Vol. 26 No. 1, September 2002 5-25  
© 2002 Sage Publications

Southern Maine report that “the 1990s witnessed an explosion of efforts designed to improve government performance” (p. 264). Donald Kettl (1997, 2000) of the University of Wisconsin goes further calling it a “Global Revolution” in performance management.

Yet all of these concepts, strategies, tactics, initiatives, and labels are motivated by the same, single purpose: to improve the performance of public agencies; to enhance the results and value produced by government.<sup>3</sup> The objective is to move from process-oriented and rule-driven management to performance-oriented and results-driven management. No longer will public managers and public employees concentrate only on following the rules. Under performance management, they will also focus on improving performance, producing results, and adding value.

For example, President George W. Bush has offered “a bold strategy for improving the management and performance of the federal government.” This “management agenda” is “results-oriented,” says the president. “What matters most is performance” (Office of Management and Budget, 2001, p. 1). Sounds very much like the National Performance Review—but without any little red book.

But can public managers really use the concepts of performance management (whatever they might be) to actually improve the performance of their organizations—to get them to produce more and better results? It is not clear that the research that praises various (and usually isolated) examples of performance management is not—in George Frederickson’s (1992) famous phrase—simply “painting bull’s eyes around bullet holes.” Given the large number of public agencies and the stochastic nature of organizational behavior, we should expect that some agencies would perform better than others, that some of those that performed better would appear to be employing some of the concepts of public management, and that a few public-management scholars might stumble across them.<sup>4</sup>

Still, it is not as if the concepts of performance management are completely atheoretical. Many are descended from some distinguished theoretical pedigrees. Behind many of the ideas of internal management—for example, how to motivate improved performance by employees inside an organization—lie a variety of ideas from social psychology (Herzberg, Mausner, & Snyderman, 1993; Maslow, 1998; Weick, 1979), many of which have been employed by private-sector organizations to improve performance. And the ideas of marketization—using market incentives to motivate improved performance—have a long and distinguished ancestry in economics.

Yes, there are questions about how these ideas ought to be applied in democratic government and how such applications might mesh or clash with both the fundamental principles and operational realities of our democracy (Moe, 1994; Moe & Gilmour, 1995; Savoie, 1995). But such concerns may not trouble the individual public manager who is under real and explicit pressure to improve performance (however such improvement might be defined). Public managers everywhere have some incentive to employ the ideas of performance management—or, at least, to pretend that they are employing them.

Indeed, the rhetoric of performance management—for example, Osborne and Gaebler’s (1992, chap. 1) admonition that government should “steer not row”—has

been widely echoed by practitioners at all levels of government. Many public managers report that they are aggressively engaged in performance management. Many do collect and publish all sorts of performance measures.<sup>5</sup> But do they really *use* these measures in any way that might actually feed back to create improved performance? If you examine closely what public managers are actually doing, it often looks more like a hoop-jumping exercise than a real adaptation of even a few of the basic ideas of performance management to the challenge of actually producing more and better results in their particular circumstance (Behn, 1999; Julnes & Holzer, 2001).

For example, police departments across the country have adopted Compstat, the performance-management strategy pioneered by the New York City Police Department (O'Connell, 2001; Silverman, 1999, p. 5). The Web sites of many big-city police departments feature a description of that city's version of Compstat. But are these police departments really using the principles of Compstat to drive performance up and crime down? Or are they just putting on a show? Are they really employing the four principles defined by Jack Maple (1999), when he was deputy commissioner for operations of the New York Police Department: "(1) accurate and timely intelligence, (2) rapid deployment, (3) effective tactics, (4) relentless follow-up and assessment" (p. 32)? Or are they simply holding meetings and putting maps on the wall?

Many, I think, have adopted Compstat primarily to ward off criticism. After all, during the 1990s, serious crime in New York dropped significantly (Karmen, 2000). What urban police chief—faced with demands to also reduce crime—wants to be asked: "How come you aren't doing Compstat?" In fact, you can hardly claim to run a modern police department in the United States today if you are not doing Compstat. And so police departments across the country hold Compstat meetings and put Compstat maps on the wall. But Compstat visitors should beware: It is not just about the meetings and the maps.<sup>6</sup>

If you ask public managers if they are using the various techniques of performance management, they will, of course, answer "yes." But if you examine what they are really doing, you will discover that they are not truly employing the principles in a manner that is apt to produce real improvements in outcomes and value.<sup>7</sup>

Performance management has not swept the world; it lives more in rhetoric than reality. Most public managers, for example, still row more than they steer.

### **Possible Explanations for the Failure of Performance Management to Sweep the World**

If performance management is so promising—if it has worked so well (if in only particular circumstances)—why has its impact on government been more rhetorical than behavioral? Why is not everyone doing it? Why have public managers not been intelligently and tenaciously adapting the concepts of performance management to the particular performance challenges faced by their own agencies?

As with most such questions about public management, this one has no universal answer. Rather, there exist a variety of possible explanations, some of which provide more insight in some situations, whereas in other circumstances, a different combination of these explanations may prove more edifying.

The first, and most obvious, explanation is *practical*: performance management does not work. And, indeed, there are numerous skeptics among both academics who are paid to be cynical and managers who are paid to be careful. Performance management is not a coherent set of proven ideas, say the scornful scholars. Performance management will not work in my organization, say the prudent practitioners. And, even if it does work, there is, as Joseph Wholey (1999) of the University of Southern California asks, “the question of whether and when the value of performance-based management will outweigh the cost” (p. 304). Or, it could work but, as Peter Smith (1995) of the University of York reports, it could also have some “unintended consequences.”

The second possible explanation is *political*: Performance management is not politically useful. It does not win election—or reelection—for anyone. It does not get anyone defeated very often either. No one builds a campaign against an incumbent president, governor, or mayor on a platform promising to eliminate any form of performance management. No one campaigns against a U.S. representative, state legislator, or city council member by denouncing the incumbent for promoting performance management. In our frequent and various campaigns for public office, candidates, journalists, opinion leaders, and voters mostly ignore the performance of public agencies—and the specifics of performance management. And if elected officials do not care about performance management, political or career managers will not either.<sup>8</sup>

A third possible explanation is *managerial*: Performance management is damn hard (Kettl, 1997, pp. 454-455). The leaders of a public agency cannot just open the performance-management cookbook, use the index to find the recipe that applies to their agency, and follow the instructions. Or, to use a more contemporary metaphor, they cannot buy the performance-management software, input their organization’s internal and external characteristics plus its performance needs, and then click the mouse to get a Web page of instructions. It is not easy to ratchet up the performance of a single public agency, let alone a collection of many public agencies. It is not easy to figure out which of the many (and perhaps even contradictory) concepts of public management will work in any specific set of circumstances.

In any effort to produce bigger and better results, the leadership team of any government organization faces a variety of challenges. For example, they must operate within the confines of a large number of significant constraints. They cannot simply deploy their dollars and people so as to maximize results or public value. They must cope with a variety of overhead agencies, internal regulators, and stakeholder organizations who possess the formal or informal authority to tell them: “No. You can’t do that.” Still, these political and regulatory constraints, which make performance management (and public management in general) so difficult, are not the sole reason why so many public executives have not jumped on the performance-management bandwagon.

A fourth possible explanation is *psychological*: The explicit use of performance measures—which is inherent to almost all forms of performance management—creates some valid fears: “If my organization starts measuring performance, what might happen?” Many of the possible consequences of attempting to measure performance are not positive (Smith, 1995). The repercussions of any effort to measure performance are not necessarily positive for the individuals in the organization or for the organization itself. Many public managers and public employees harbor some very legitimate fears of performance measurement (Julnes & Holzer, 2001).

A fifth possible explanation is also *psychological*: Performance management requires a variety of people—from the leaders of a public agency to legislators and citizens—to think differently about the overall responsibilities of government, about the responsibilities of individual public employees and teams of employees, about the responsibilities of each of the three branches of government, and about the responsibilities of citizens. And to change the thinking of these different people—and thus to change their behavior—will be difficult.

As is usually the case when multiple explanations for human behavior are possible, no single one is valid for all individuals or circumstances. Rather, in every situation, the real explanation is some unique combination of the various possibilities. Thus, when sorting out cause and effect (and then attempting to modify such linkages), it is important to understand each potential explanation. The first four explanations—the practical, political, and managerial explanations, plus the psychological fears of the consequences of creating and using performance measures—have been analyzed extensively (Julnes & Holzer, 2001). Thus, I will examine the fifth explanation—the mental reorientation that performance management requires of so many people.

### Thinking (and Rethinking) About Performance

This second psychological explanation for the failure of performance management to sweep the public-management world may not have been carefully examined or even explicitly defined. Yet a lack of scholarly attention to this barrier, which involves the implicit thinking of numerous people, does not mean that public managers have failed to recognize it. After all, public managers are “trained”—not in the formal sense but in the on-the-job sense—to identify potential problems. That is how they moved up the organizational hierarchy—by keeping a succession of larger and larger units out of trouble. They mastered rule-driven management. They figured out how to abide by the formal regulations created by the overhead units of personnel and procurement. They learned how to adjust to the unofficial norms enforced by journalists, legislators, and stakeholders. And once a public manager realizes, if only implicitly, that performance management will require a lot of people to think (let alone act) very differently, he or she can simply choose to focus on something less risky than attempting to employ an entire set of new strategies.<sup>9</sup> Why try to introduce the sacrifice bunt and base stealing to a team that has been very successful with the three-run home run—particularly when the team lacks speed and does not know how to bunt?

After all, the shift from traditional, rules-driven management to innovative, results-driven management involves more than the mere replacement of one set of managerial tools with another. It requires a complete mental reorientation. And it is not just the managers who have to think differently. Citizens, legislators, and others in the executive branch all need to reorient their thinking, and much of the thinking that inhibits the shift to performance management is strictly implicit.

In particular, how citizens, legislators, public employees, policy makers, and politically appointed executives think about performance and results creates some real barriers to their ability to focus on outcomes and value. Until each of these groups begins to think differently about what government should and should not do, the concepts of

performance management may remain primarily a set of theoretical ideas that are used only occasionally by a few, independently wealthy mavericks who need not worry about society's ability to punish their heresies or failures.

### CITIZEN THINKING

When citizens think about government performance, they naturally emphasize personal results rather than societal results. This kind of thinking is inherently human.

It may be presumptuous to suggest that all citizens employ the same mental framework when they think about government performance. (Indeed, it might be presumptuous to suggest that many citizens ever think about government performance or that they actually employ any consistent framework when they do.) Nevertheless, the what's-in-it-for-me framework does have a distinguished heritage.

Still, it is not easy for citizens to employ even this traditional framework. After all, to do so, a citizen has to figure out three different things: (a) What components of this governmental activity might affect me? (b) How might these components affect me? (c) How do I evaluate the net effect of these personal consequences? And, although we tend to think that such "rational" thinking is both common and easy, it is not necessarily either (Bauer, Pool, & Dexter, 1972, pp. 127-143, 472-475; Lindblom, 1959; Simon, 1997, pp. 93-97).

Using the new performance framework is, however, even more difficult. Again, citizens have to figure out three different things, but these three things are more complicated and require much more thought: (a) What components of this government activity might affect what parts of society? (b) How might these components affect these different parts of society? (c) How do I evaluate the net effect of these societal consequences? Clearly it is much more challenging to analyze the impacts of a governmental activity on all of society than it is to think about its impacts on me.

Still, it is not just the analytic challenge that makes this new kind of performance thinking difficult for citizens. The fundamental shift is psychological—from what's in it for me to what's in it for society. When the performance measures for the state's school districts are published on the front page of the papers, what performance numbers do citizens look at and care about? Those for the state as a whole or those for their local district? Even those citizens whose children have graduated from high school care more about their local district's performance (if only because its performance affects their property values). And when citizens think about the steps that should be taken to improve school performance, are they more worried about the resources needed in their own district or about the changes needed in educational strategies statewide?

Performance management requires a set of macro strategies that can change operational behavior at the service-delivery level. It requires macro strategies that can improve the performance of every unit. It requires an expectation that every unit (e.g., every school in the state) will improve its performance. Thus, it requires a set of macro strategies designed to improve the performance of every unit up to the statewide standard.<sup>10</sup>

## LEGISLATIVE THINKING

When legislators think about the “results” of government’s efforts, they tend to place more emphasis on where the inputs are immediately deployed than on what outcomes might be eventually achieved. After all, the ultimate consequences might not be realized for years, whereas the inputs can be distributed (or, at least, announced) tomorrow. And the legislators may have to stand for reelection before the outcomes are realized but not before the inputs are distributed. Indeed, the legislators may have to stand for election several times before it becomes the least bit obvious whether the inputs that have been distributed are producing anything close to the outcomes that have been promised (Behn, 1981, pp. 206-211; Kettl, 1997, p. 456).

An obvious example is K-12 education. The new funds for more teachers to reduce the size of classes can be distributed this year. But the outcomes about which we as a society really care—students who grow up to be productive employees and responsible citizens—cannot be evaluated for years. As we decide whether to vote for our incumbent state legislator or the challenger, we cannot evaluate the incumbent by examining the value that our local schools have added to our children’s and society’s future, but we can evaluate this incumbent by checking on the number of new teachers that he or she convinced the state to allocate to our town.

We citizens have decided that our legislators (and other elected officials) will serve terms that last just 2 or 4 years; thus, we have implicitly told them to worry about the short term. And when we impose term limits on legislators, we have implicitly reinforced this message: Ignore any consequences that will occur after your legal ability to be reelected has expired.

Elected chief executives—presidents, governors, and mayors—can also engage in this legislative thinking. When they stand for reelection, we will evaluate them by looking at what they have produced during the previous 4 (or, in a few cases, 2) years. Nevertheless, an elected chief executive has more of an opportunity to establish a reputation based on the government’s performance in the years after he or she leaves office. As he retired after 2 decades as chief executive officer of General Electric, Jack Welch observed, “You should measure my success eventually by how well GE does in the next five years” (Murray, 2001, p. B10).

The same could and should be said for an elected chief executive. If a governor or a mayor sought to apply the concepts of performance management to a state’s or city’s school system, we citizens would realize that this chief executive’s impact on the outcomes produced by these schools would not be fully realized for years or even decades. An elected chief executive does (or can) exercise significant personal influence over future governmental performance by defining (or redefining) the nature of real performance, by establishing some explicit measures to drive that performance, by developing talent, and by fostering an explicit culture of performance.

For example, President Clinton promised to wage a war on terrorism yet did very little; now citizens are remembering his administration’s failure to create an effective long-term strategy (Miller, 2001). Because both the president and what the president says are so visible, we citizens often measure his success by how well the nation does in the years after he leaves office.

The same, however, applies to only a few legislators. Those who are able to accumulate expertise, prestige, and authority—for example, the Speaker of the House, or the chairman of the senate finance committee—are able to have some visible, long-term impact on their government's performance in some policy areas. But we do not really expect our individual legislator to have very much impact on the government's long-term performance. We do, however, recognize that our legislator can definitely have a short-term impact on how many new resources are allocated to our community. Given these institutional arrangements, we should not be surprised that, when it comes to the performance of government, legislators necessarily employ a very high discount rate and emphasize inputs over outcomes.

### **PUBLIC-EMPLOYEE THINKING**

When public employees think about the consequences of their work, they are more concerned about avoiding mistakes that *will* produce certain punishment than about producing successes that *might* generate a little praise. This kind of thinking is the direct result of the accountability and reward system that we Americans have created for our public officials (from top executives to frontline workers). As I have written elsewhere, all public employees recognize how this accountability system works: "When they do something good, nothing happens. But when they screw up, all hell can break loose." Operationally, "accountability means punishment" (Behn, 2001, p. 3). As D. F. Kettl (personal communication, January 29, 2002) observes: "Performance measures are often a way for managers to paint bull's eyes on their backs and invite incoming fire."

This implicit but very real system of punishment makes rule-driven management so attractive. If you simply follow the rules—if you fill out all of the forms completely and adhere to the letter of every prescribed process—you cannot make a mistake. And if you cannot make a mistake, you cannot get punished. Following the rules is the rational response to our traditional system of governmental incentives. Indeed, to even worry about results—to steal time from an assiduous attention to satisfying all of the myriad rules—is irrational. After all, the performance of any organization, public or private, depends not only on internal leadership and management but also on a variety of exogenous forces; thus, any failure of performance to match expectations can be explained away by some of these unforeseen, unforeseeable, and uncontrollable forces. Failure to follow the rules is, however, a personal failing.

Like legislators, public employees pay attention to the incentives that we citizens create for them. We have not written into every legislator's oath of office a sentence that explicitly says: "I promise to focus on the short-term distribution of inputs to my constituents and to ignore the long-term performance of government agencies and the long-term value that they might create for citizens." We have not written into every civil servant's oath of office a sentence that explicitly says: "I promise to take no action that might possibly be interpreted by someone as being a procedural, legal, or political mistake and to avoid wasting any of my time on trying to improve my organization's performance." We do not have to. We need not require legislators or civil servants to take this kind of pledge. We have already created an easy-to-understand and easy-to-implement reward structure that has precisely the same consequence.

## POLICY THINKING

When many people reflect on the challenge of improving the work of government, they focus on creating better policy rather than on managing better within the existing policy framework. This kind of thinking reflects the persistent ascendancy of policy over management.<sup>11</sup>

Policy is the grand, exhilarating work of inventing new organizations and new systems to achieve new or loftier purposes. In contrast, management is the mundane, grunt work of getting existing organizations and existing systems to work better so as to achieve existing purposes. Policy thinking suggests that people who really want to make a big difference should focus their energies on crafting visible, innovative policies that will dramatically affect the behavior of all of the existing organizations and systems or—even better—concocting visible, innovative policies that require the creation of new (visible and innovative) organizations and systems.

In his “management agenda,” President Bush observes that “government likes to begin things—to declare grand new programs and causes.” Moreover, he notes that Congress faces “an understandable temptation to ignore management reforms in favor of new policies and programs.”<sup>12</sup> But it is not just Congress that is tempted to devote its attention to new policies and programs. Legislators at all levels are so tempted. So are scholars in universities and think tanks, analysts in policy and budget shops, and executive-branch managers at all levels of government. This “understandable temptation” is a direct consequence of policy thinking.

The appeal of policy over management seems unaffected by the accumulation of evidence suggesting that policy innovations without competent (and, perhaps even, innovative) management will accomplish little (Bardach, 1977; Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973). However, as long as making public policy appears to be more exciting and more consequential than managing public organizations, performance management will not attract the attention, the resources, or the talent necessary to produce meaningful improvements. Policy thinking drains talented people away from the important work of improving the operational performance of public agencies.

## ASSISTANT-SECRETARY THINKING

When ambitious political appointees consider what they can accomplish while in office, they tend to choose to craft a new policy innovation rather than to improve their organization’s capacity to perform. After all, most political appointees serve for only a brief period of time; the average tenure of an assistant secretary in the federal government hovers around 2 years.<sup>13</sup> And in 2 years as the leader of any organizational unit, public or private, most people can make progress only if they can limit and focus their agenda.

This necessity of leadership’s limited agenda applies not just to appointed managers but to elected ones as well. Every 2 years, the National Governors’ Association holds its Seminar for New Governors during which veteran governors offer their new colleagues the wisdom they have gained. And one important lesson that they frequently impart is: “Keep your agenda short. You’ll only have time to build the necessary coalitions for three or four priorities” (Beyle & Huefner, 1983, p. 268). And with only two exceptions, the nation’s governors serve 4-year terms. And with only one

exception, the nation's governors can seek reelection for a second, consecutive term. Nonetheless, even governors who can hold office for 8 years—subject to only one intervening performance review—feel compelled to limit their agenda. Certainly the same rule ought to apply to less powerful public executives who might serve only 2 years.

Moreover, before they take office, many political appointees well recognize that they will serve for only a brief time. Thus, when they begin their tour as political executives, such individuals need to think seriously about what they might possibly achieve during their limited time, about what they might feel proud of accomplishing during this time, about what they might do to establish a reputation during this time. Consequently, even if political appointees have not already fallen captive to policy thinking, they will implicitly recognize that their time horizon is necessarily short and will thus focus on policy rather than management.<sup>14</sup>

In 2 years, an assistant secretary can design a new policy initiative and get it authorized (be that through legislation, executive order, or internal fiat). In contrast, improving the management of the organization—in particular, improving the performance of the organization—will take much longer. Sure, the assistant secretary could within 2 years make significant improvements in the organization's capacity to perform better. But the actual performance consequences of this capacity-building effort might not become obvious or measurable until well after the assistant secretary has returned to the private sector or has been promoted to another job. And because their jobs are a lot less visible than Jack Welch's, few assistant secretaries can expect that any improvements in their organization's future performance will ever be credited to their work. Many political executives think as David Stockman, President Reagan's director of the Office of Management and Budget, did in 1981: "I'm just not going to spend a lot of political capital solving some other guy's problem in 2010" (Greider, 1981, p. 43).

Assistant-secretary thinking can reflect a self-indulgent lust to enhance one's personal reputation. Alternatively, assistant-secretary thinking can reflect an altruistic assessment about how best to maximize one's contribution to society subject to a (very real and very short) time constraint. Or, it can reflect some combination of these motives. Regardless—whether a new political appointee is attempting to maximize personal or societal benefits—he or she is apt to conclude that it makes more sense to concentrate on creating a new policy innovation than on fixing the organization's capacity to perform.

### **DISTRUSTFUL THINKING**

Often, a performance-management strategy depends on "the big bargain": more flexibility for more performance. "We'll give you more flexibility," promise the superiors of an agency's managers, "if you'll give us more performance." Behind the big bargain is the assumption that if the agency does not have to follow as many rules, it will be able to produce more results.

The big bargain can be sealed through a formal performance contract or an informal performance agreement. Regardless, the underlying reasoning is the same: One reason that public agencies cannot improve performance is because they are stifled by too

many rules—too many procurement rules, too many personnel rules, too many budgetary rules, too many damn rules. To get a public agency to improve performance, continues this reasoning, you have to get rid of some (or many) of the rules. Even if the rules themselves do not actually get in the way, public managers have to devote resources and time to ensure that all of the rules are meticulously followed—valuable resources and time that could be devoted to improving performance. Thus, implicit in most of the conceptions of performance management is the need to give the organization's leadership team some significant flexibility (Behn, 2001, pp. 123-125).

Unfortunately, no one person—not even the elected chief executive—can really promise that much more flexibility. After all, each rule has a well-established rationale. As Herbert Kaufman (1977), long of the Brookings Institution, once observed, "One person's 'red tape' may be another's treasured procedural safeguard" (p. 4). And for each such treasured safeguard, there exists a well-established organization to enforce it. The procurement agency enforces the procurement safeguards; the personnel agency enforces the personnel safeguards. The people in these overhead agencies have seen elected chief executives come and go. And, they know that failing to enforce the rules is the one, quick way that they can get into trouble. Moreover, some additional official enforcers exist—legislators, auditors, and inspectors general—plus a collection of unofficial enforcers—stakeholders, journalists, candidates, and watchdog groups.

As commissioner of the Bureau of Reclamation, Dan Beard distributed "forgiveness coupons" to the bureau's managers. If one of them, while experimenting with an innovative way to better achieve the bureau's mission, made a "mistake," he or she could cash it in with the commissioner (Gore, 1994, p. 320). Unfortunately, although a boss can forgive a subordinate's mistakes, this boss cannot grant absolution. Other enforcers, both official and unofficial, are under no obligation to honor any such "forgiveness coupon."

Thus, to the distrusting agency head, "the big bargain" is really "the big gamble." Sure, an agency head can enter into an agreement with his or her elected chief executive. But the agency head is completely powerless to enforce this agreement. The elected executive can promise more flexibility, but he or she cannot always deliver. Both the elected executive and the agency head know this. Consequently, the agency head balks at entering into any such performance bargain—even if it is informal. For regardless of whether the promise of flexibility is fulfilled, the agency head recognizes that the expectations for improved performance will remain.

To the distrustful (or astute, or pragmatic, or cynical) public manager, the big bargain of performance management is no bargain at all.

### **BIG-PICTURE THINKING**

When many people think about the challenge of improving government performance, they are so overwhelmed with the enormity of the task that they are blinded to the opportunity to create some meaningful improvement through a series of individually small, but collectively significant actions. Rather, they observe big problems and conclude that they can only be attacked with big solutions. Moreover, to get society to

pay attention to the problem, to convince society to devote some of its limited resources to attacking the problem, people feel compelled to portray the problem as a big one.

Mesmerized by such big-picture thinking, people overlook the possibility of making progress by slowly but steadily ratcheting up the performance of the organization responsible for dealing with the problem. Rather, they think that their big problem necessarily requires a big solution—with big policy changes and the allocation of significant resources. (In this way, big-picture thinking contributes to policy thinking.) But if big changes in policy cannot be negotiated through the requisite authorizing channels and the significant resources (in either high-level attention or dollars) cannot be obtained, big-picture thinking produces little progress and much frustration.

In his classic article outlining a “strategy of small wins,” Karl Weick (1984) of Cornell University observes that “people often define social problems in ways that overwhelm their ability to do anything about them.” As a society, we have reached a general “agreement” that our social problems are “big problems,” writes Weick. “And that’s the problem” (p. 40).

Weick (1984) argues that we should “recast larger problems into smaller, less arousing problems” that will give people an opportunity to “identify a series of controllable opportunities of modest size that produce visible results.” Producing results is, of course, the purpose of performance management. But who will listen to the advocate of a small-wins, performance-management strategy that promises not to solve a big problem but, instead, as Weick suggests, will “call a problem minor rather than serious”—even though, as he continues, to do so is “appropriate if people don’t know what to do or are unable to do it” (pp. 40, 41).

Who will choose to work on a minor problem when so many serious problems exist that merit the serious effort of serious people? This is the logic of big-picture thinking.

### **Self-Interested Thinking and Societal Thinking**

These seven different kinds of thinking can be divided up another way—into two categories based on their motivation:

- Self-interested thinking. Citizens, legislators, public employees, assistant secretaries, and distrustful managers think in terms of their personal self-interest.
- Societal thinking. Policy thinking and big-picture thinking are not derived from the particular incentives under which specific individuals must work. Rather, they reflect societal attitudes—views that manifest themselves only subtly.

This taxonomy might help us analyze how we could influence these psychological barriers. Adjusting the design of our political institutions could influence some forms of self-interested thinking. Societal thinking, however, is more likely to be influenced by information and education. Both efforts, however, will require leadership.

Human cognition and psychological behavior may be instinctive and unconscious. These processes are shaped, however, by the institutional arrangements that we humans created—sometimes instinctively and unconsciously, sometimes knowingly and deliberately. Indeed, several of the psychological barriers—particularly legisla-

tive, public-employee, assistant-secretary, and distrustful thinking—are fostered (if not created) by the formal structures of government as well as the informal conventions, customs, and norms of our politics. Thus, we might be able to affect some of these psychological barriers to performance by deliberately redesigning our political institutions.

For example, consider how we might change the incentives that affect the thinking of legislators, public employees, assistant secretaries, and distrustful managers. To lengthen the time horizon of legislators and encourage them to worry about the outputs and outcomes of policy as well as the distribution of the inputs, we could give legislators longer terms (rather than imposing term limits, which exacerbate short-term, legislative thinking). To encourage assistant secretaries to think more about management and less about policy, we could ask these political appointees to make a 4-year (or even 8-year) commitment to a specific position and to a specific performance task and ask elected officials to keep their political appointees in a single position for at least one full term. To encourage public employees to worry more about improving performance and less about avoiding mistakes, we could reward them as much as we punish them, frequently recognizing individual and team contributions to improved performance while imposing fewer and less severe penalties on those who make minor, “honest” mistakes.

Furthermore, we could attempt to make the big bargain—more performance for more flexibility—real. To do so, however, will take more than promises. Prudent public managers do not believe in promises. To convince the cautious agency head (to say nothing about the cynics) will require some proof. And that proof will be revealed only through actual experiments in which the additional flexibility is indeed forthcoming—even in the face of opposition and a few publicized examples of the misuse of this flexibility. Thus, converting the big bargain into a real bargain will begin with a few small but successful experiments, followed by more not so small and successful experiments, followed by some even bigger and still successful experiments.<sup>15</sup> Such experiments will be necessary to change the incentives of agency heads and convince them that it makes sense to enter into the performance-for-flexibility bargain.

Of course, performance—as measured by specific results produced by specific public agencies—is not our only public value. We citizens treasure our procedural safeguards because they reflect important public values. We care that government handles our money properly and treats each of us equitably, and thus we treasure the procedures that safeguard these values. Consequently, we citizens are uncomfortable with a performance-for-flexibility bargain designed to remove some of the psychological barriers to performance management if this deal also requires us to sacrifice some of our constitutional safeguards.<sup>16</sup>

Our political institutions foster the self-interested thinking that hinders the performance of government. And these institutions are, in turn, fostered by the self-interested thinking of citizens. Such citizen thinking has not, however, been created by our political institutions. The self-interested thinking of citizens simply exists—prior to and independent of government. And although some argue that all self-interested thinking is genetically based (Dawkins, 1989), the self-interested thinking of legislators, public employees, assistant secretaries, and distrustful managers is reenforced by the design

of our governmental institutions. Not so for citizen thinking. How then might we convince citizens to alter (although not discard) their self-interested thinking—to worry less about personal results and more about societal results?

We might be able to convince citizens to pay a little more attention to societal outcomes if we gave them more outcome information more frequently. After all, citizens have a wide variety of informal ways to learn about the educational performance of their local school or the results produced by the state environmental protection agency in cleaning up their nearby river. They have many fewer sources of information about statewide or nationwide accomplishments (and may simply infer statewide or nationwide performance from the local performance that they themselves can observe<sup>17</sup>). Thus, some additional information on performance on a societal scale might help to broaden citizens' thinking.

Altering the two kinds of societal thinking—policy thinking and big-picture thinking—will also be difficult, both conceptually and operationally. For, again, this thinking reflects not the kind of political institutions we created but the kind of humans we are. And, even if we thought we could figure out what kind of cognitive frameworks might best supplant both policy thinking and big-picture thinking, we would still face the challenge of getting people to modify their subconscious habits. Still, some educational efforts might mitigate some of the consequences of policy and big-picture thinking. For example, Blaine Liner and his Urban Institute colleagues (2001) report,

Most legislators seem less than enamored with performance data and do not seek them out. Nevertheless, from the little evidence available, it appears that when agencies provide clear and meaningful outcome data (such as information on infant mortality, traffic injuries, juvenile delinquency, and numbers of fish kills caused by pollution), these data will get legislators' attention. (p. 89)

These seven modes of thinking—and the barriers that they create to performance management—are not about to disappear. Intellectually, we citizens may believe that improving the performance of public agencies is essential and that we need to redesign public institutions to foster such performance. But such an intellectual epiphany will not eliminate the seven psychological barriers. As Thomas Schelling (1978) of the University of Maryland has explained, our collective macro behavior has been created by the interaction of our individual micro behaviors that have, in turn, been driven by our individual micro motives. And unless we somehow change our individual micro political motives, we will be unable to modify the resulting macro political behavior.

Yet as Steve Kerr (1975), now the chief learning officer at Goldman Sachs, observed long ago, we persist in “the folly of rewarding A while hoping for B.” We hope for improved performance, yet we continue to reward behavior that directly inhibits that performance (while punishing behavior that might enhance it).

### **The Necessity of Performance Leadership**

Society does, however, have one useful mechanism for influencing micro political motives and thus macro political behavior. It is called leadership.

Many of the different concepts that are called *performance management* are not active strategies but passive procedures: a new performance-measurement system, a new performance-budgeting system, a new performance-planning system, a new performance-pay system. These procedural systems consist of rules and processes and deadlines and reports. They do not depend on leadership. They are based on the assumption that the new systems' requirements will force changes in behavior that will, somehow, improve performance. They are based on the assumption that no human leadership is required. The procedures created by the system are themselves adequate. Once such a performance-management system is established, goes the never-stated assumption, everything will function on automatic pilot.

Most of the administrative systems that are labeled *performance management* will have little impact on the seven psychological barriers. Nevertheless, they might affect behavior. But the kind of behavior they are most likely to encourage is bureaucratic gaming. Most efforts to comply with the procedural demands of any new system—"If they want performance measures, I'll give them performance measures"—will do little to produce better results. A new performance-budgeting system can require the annual budget to contain a variety of performance indicators, but it cannot require anyone to intelligently deploy these data to drive performance.<sup>18</sup>

Real performance management requires an active strategy. It requires energetic leadership. It requires a leader, or a team of leaders, to make a conscious effort to change the behavior of the individuals who work for the organization and its collaborators. It requires a leader to make a strategic effort to change the thinking of others from executive-branch superiors and legislators, to journalists and opinion leaders, to stakeholders and citizens. This is the difference between an *active performance-leadership strategy* such as Compstat and a *passive performance-management system* such as the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA).

GPRA requires federal agencies to produce an annual performance plan or performance report containing a variety of indexes. Any senior federal executive who is good at jumping through hoops (and it is hard to become a senior federal executive without acquiring a lot of dexterity at hoop jumping) can produce an adequate GPRA report. If a government operations committee does not like it, the executive may get whacked around a little. That is just part of the game. Do not take it too personally.

In contrast, Compstat as deployed in New York City drives the behavior of precinct commanders and patrol officers. It does not merely require the precinct commanders to issue a fiscal-year plan or annual report containing voluminous data. The leadership of the New York Police Department seeks to analyze weekly changes and long-term trends in criminal activity—and to develop specific strategies for dealing with very specific deficiencies in performance. Yes, it is a system. Yes, a mayor could require a police chief to establish a Compstat system. Yes, the police chief could jump through all of the required hoops. But Compstat—as conceived and implemented by William Bratton, Louis Anemone, and Jack Maple—is not merely a system. It is how the top executives of the New York Police Department exercise leadership. It is a vehicle for getting the key managers throughout the organization to focus weekly on first their performance deficiencies and then on possible strategies for producing better results. But without the active leadership by the department's top executives, Compstat is just another passive procedure.

Yes, a precinct commander could jump through this hoop too. But those who did so in New York City soon became ex-precinct commanders. And so did those who were unable to develop strategies to improve their precinct's performance.

If public officials are to make performance management live up to its promise to improve the consequences of governmental action, they will need to figure out some way to cope with the seven psychological barriers. Perhaps they can temper some by redesigning our existing institutions. Perhaps they can lower others through information and education. Perhaps public managers can ignore a few barriers and evade others. None of these barriers, however, are apt to be torn down or disappear.

That is why we need more than performance management. That is why we need performance leadership.

### Notes

1. There are two different definitions of *performance management*. As used by human resources professionals, the phrase refers to efforts to improve the performance of individual employees through personal performance plans, performance appraisals, and the usual collection of carrots and sticks (see, e.g., Grote, 2000). This is not, however, what I mean by *performance management* (nor what it means to John Palguta, 2001, of the U.S. Systems Protection Board). To me, performance management is the collection of organizational, managerial, and leadership strategies that are designed to get the people within a public agency—and their essential collaborators—to achieve specific public purposes (Behn, 2001, chap. 2).

2. Please call me immediately if you know of any publication titled "Performance Management Is Inherently Evil" or "Managing for Performance Is Damaging the Effectiveness of Public Agencies." Thanks!

3. When I think about performance management, I focus on the strategies that the leadership team of a specific public agency can use to ratchet up the measurable results that the agency has been charged with producing—for example, the number of welfare recipients placed in jobs (Behn, 1991, chap. 4). However, as my colleague Mark Moore repeatedly reminds me, there is a second way of conceptualizing the performance challenge: Public managers have the responsibility to rethink and redefine the value that their organization contributes to society (Moore, 1995). Thus, I talk here about both "the results and value produced by government."

At the same time, Moore and I may not be that far apart. After all, when the leadership team that I chronicle (Behn, 1991) took over the Massachusetts Department of Public Welfare in 1983, the idea that a welfare agency produced public value by actually (and actively) helping welfare recipients move to psychological and economic independence was not the common assumption that it is today. Thus, these executives both rethought the nature of the value that their department would create and redefined the measurable results that it would produce. Then, it ratcheted up that number.

4. For example, the Center for Accountability and Performance (CAP) was created by the American Society for Public Administration "to address the requirement for all levels of government to move to performance-based, results-driven management" and to "demonstrate the value of performance measurement and management to line managers, staff, elected officials and the public." Toward this end, CAP has produced 39 different case studies "of performance management in government" (<http://www.aspanet.org/cap/index.html>). For another example, see Behn (1991).

5. In fact, one way to defeat those who want public managers to measure their organization's performance is to produce a plethora of performance measures—raw data, activity counts, dollars saved—that are open to so many different interpretations that no one can possibly absorb or analyze them all. For example, Liner and his Urban Institute colleagues (2001) report,

The initial years of implementation of governing-for-results in the states have been characterized by the production of voluminous numbers of indicators of amount of activity, counts of the program's physical products, and "intermediate outcomes," such as response-time data. (p. 89)

6. From a study of the diffusion of civil service reform, Tolbert and Zucker (1983) suggest that public organizations adopt innovations either because they are required to do so by higher authority or "because of their [the reforms'] societal legitimacy, regardless of their value for the internal functioning of the organization." Moreover, Tolbert and Zucker continue, when organizational innovations "are widely understood to be appropriate and necessary components of efficient, rational organizations, organizations are under considerable pressure to incorporate these elements into their formal structure in order to maintain their legitimacy" (p. 26).

Unlike in the case of civil service reform, no state legislature has required its cities to adopt Compstat. Nevertheless, its visibility generated considerable societal pressure on urban police departments. After all, New York is the media center of the country; its crime rate did drop significantly during the years following the implementation of Compstat; and the meetings and maps are very conspicuous, easily comprehended, and widely available technologies. Delegations from police departments across the country (and around the world) visited New York to watch the meetings and see the maps (Gootman, 2000; Silverman, 1999, p. 5). And, so when they went home, they too created meetings and maps—and invited their local opinion leaders to come and observe their meetings and their maps.

A similar point could be made about community policing. Although the concept and its implementation were much less visible, police departments across the country adopted this innovation. However, Moore, Kelling, and Wycoff (1995) report, "Much of what now passes for community policing is but a pale imitation of the grand vision." About community policing, Maple (1999) offers a similar view: "Police executives everywhere" have "been faking its implementation almost since it was dreamed up" (p. 122).

7. For example, from a survey in the United Kingdom, Holloway, Francis, and Hinton (1999) report that 58% of managers in government "claimed" to be engaged in benchmarking. However, when they examined what these managers were actually doing, they found that "in practice the [benchmarking] efforts are often directed towards operational or easy-to-change processes or even simply towards measuring outputs with no attempt to understand the processes which let to them" (p. 354). Thus, they concluded that most of these managers possessed "a lack of appreciation about what benchmarking really requires" (p. 353), that they focused "on what is needed to 'take the correct steps according to the text books'" (p. 355), and thus that "an essential characteristic of the approach may be missing" (p. 354). These managers reported that their organizations were engaged in benchmarking, yet they failed to comprehend (or, at least, employ) a core feature of the concept.

Similarly, in a study of the utilization of performance measurement in the United States, Julnes and Holzer (2001) found that many public agencies have formally adopted performance measurement but that many fewer have actually implemented it for such purposes as allocating resources; strategic planning; monitoring, evaluating, or managing programs; or reporting to higher management, elected officials, citizens, or journalists.

8. Of course, if the incumbent measures and publishes performance data, and if these data suggest some inadequacies in performance, a challenger can use these statistics in a campaign. Thus, because most forms of performance management require some kind of performance measures, and because it is almost impossible to keep such measures secret, elected officials have real disincentives to collect such data.

9. In some ways, these five explanations form a hierarchy. First, the public manager considers the practical question: Does performance management work? If the answer is "no," the manager need go no further. If the answer is "yes," the manager can then consider the political question, and so on. After the manager has concluded that performance management can work, that it can be politically useful (or at least acceptable), that it can be made to work in his or her particular circumstance without an impossible amount of effort, and that the use of performance measures will not create too many problems—only then will the public manager get to the stage of considering this last psychological barrier.

And at each step in this hierarchy, the answer to the question becomes less obvious. For example, a public manager is more likely to recognize (again, perhaps only implicitly) that the measurement of performance might create a collection of problems (both personal and organizational) than to understand how citizens, public officials, and public employees will have to think differently if an application of performance management is to have any real impact.

10. Elsewhere I write that, because the purpose is entertainment, it is acceptable in athletic competitions to create winners and losers.

Creating losers in a school system, however, is not fine. Our objective is not to have only one school win. Our objective is to have every school win. Our objective is not to have only one student win. Our objective is to have every student win. Yet too often we create a measurement and motivation system that automatically labels the vast majority of schools, teachers, and students as losers. (Behn, 1997, p. 34)

11. Elsewhere I call this the “policy metastrategy” of getting the policies and incentives right. I contrast it with the “administrative metastrategy” (which focuses on getting the systems, procedures, and organizational structures right) and the “leadership metastrategy” (which focuses on getting everyone in the organization to concentrate his or her energies on achieving the organization’s mission and goals) (Behn, 1991, pp. 198-208).

12. Despite this traditional emphasis on “new policies and programs,” Bush argued that “good beginnings are not the measure of success.” Instead, he continued, “what matters in the end is completion. Performance. Results. Not just making promises, but making good on promises” (Office of Management and Budget, 2001, p. 1).

13. Assistant secretaries in the federal government are not the only public managers who are vulnerable to assistant-secretary thinking. Maple (1999) reports that “police departments in the United States run through police chiefs at an average rate of one every two years” (p. 96). For a police commissioner in New York City, notes Silverman (1999), the “window of opportunity is typically limited, especially given the average tenure of just a little more than two years” (p. 57).

14. Policy thinking and assistant-secretary thinking appear to be identical. Both emphasize the transcendence of policy over management. Both reflect a belief that it makes more sense to focus on policy than management. But the psychological drivers are quite different. Policy thinking is driven by societal thinking—by the public attitudes held by people inside and outside of government. In contrast, assistant-secretary thinking is driven by self-interested thinking—by the personal calculation of short-term public managers.

15. Unfortunately, when a new auditor is elected or when a new crusading editor takes over the newspaper, the experiments may have to start all over.

16. This is what I call “the accountability dilemma—the tradeoff between accountability for finances and fairness and accountability for performance” (Behn, 2001, p. 11). We do not just want government agencies to perform better. We also want government agencies to live up to their fiduciary responsibility, to protect our political freedoms, and to abide by the decisions we have made through our democratic procedures. For a more detailed discussion of this accountability trade-off and for some possible strategies for enhancing accountability for performance without automatically weakening accountability for either finances or fairness, see Behn (2001).

17. The “availability heuristic” of cognitive psychology suggests that people generalize from easily available information (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973, 1974). Thus, when attempting to estimate the likelihood that the schools statewide are “good,” people may rely on the available information that they have about the schools in surrounding towns—or on recently available information from a recent media exposé of schools in the state’s largest city.

18. For example, a number of analyses have uncovered just such a disconnect in a variety of performance-budget systems. The requirements to include performance data in budget proposals have little effect on the actual budget decisions (Franklin, 1999, p. 203; Melkers & Willoughby, 2001, p. 61; Pollitt, 1999, p. 13).

## References

- Ammons, D. N. (Ed.). (1995). *Accountability for performance: Measurement and monitoring in local government*. Washington, DC: International City/County Management Association.
- Aucoin, P. (1995). *The new public management in comparative perspective*. Montreal, Canada: Institute for Research on Public Policy.
- Bacciocco, E. J., Jr. (1990). Survey of West Coast cities with merit pay systems. *Public Productivity & Management Review*, 13(4), 405-411.
- Bardach, E. (1977). *The implementation game: What happens after a bill becomes a law*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

- Bauer, R. A., Pool, I. de S., & Dexter, L. A. (1972). *American business and public policy: The politics of foreign trade* (2nd ed.). Chicago: Aldine.
- Behn, R. D. (1981). Policy analysis and policy politics. *Policy Analysis*, 7(2), 199-226.
- Behn, R. D. (1991). *Leadership counts: Lessons for public managers*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Behn, R. D. (1997). Linking measurement and motivation: A challenge for education. In P. W. Thurston & J. G. Ward (Eds.), *Improving educational performance: Local and systemic reforms, advances in educational administration* (Vol 5., pp. 15-58). Greenwich, CT: JAI.
- Behn, R. D. (1999). *Performance measures in state administrative agencies: Bureaucratic hoop jumping or management tool?* Remarks prepared for the annual conference of the National Association of State Chief Administrators, Salt Lake City, August 23.
- Behn, R. D. (2001). *Rethinking democratic accountability*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
- Behn, R. D., & Kant, P. A. (1999). Strategies for avoiding the pitfalls of performance contracting. *Public Productivity & Management Review*, 22(4), 470-489.
- Berry, F. S., Brower, R. S., & Flowers, G. (2000). Implementing performance accountability in Florida: What changed, what matters, and what resulted? *Public Productivity & Management Review*, 23(3), 338-358.
- Beyle, T. L., & Huefner, R. (1983). Quips and quotes from old governors to new. *Public Administration Review*, 43(3), 268-270.
- Byrnes, P., & Freeman, M. (1999). Using DEA measures of efficiency and effectiveness in contractor performance fund allocation. *Public Productivity & Management Review*, 23(2), 210-224.
- Clary, B., Ebersten, S., & Harlor, S. (2000). Organizational change issues in performance government: The case of contracting. *Public Productivity & Management Review*, 23(3), 282-296.
- Dawkins, R. (1989). *The selfish gene*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Eisenberg, E. F., & Ingraham, P. W. (1993). Analyzing the comparative pay-for-performance experience: Are there common lessons? *Public Productivity & Management Review*, 17(2), 117-128.
- Franklin, A. (1999). Managing for results in Arizona: A fifth-year report card. *Public Productivity & Management Review*, 12(2), 194-209.
- Frederickson, H. G. (1992, October). Painting bull's eyes around bullet holes. *Governing*, p. 13.
- Gootman, E. (2000, October 24). A police department's growing allure: Crime fighters from around world visit for tips. *New York Times*, p. B1.
- Gore, A. (1993). *Creating a government that works better and costs less: Report of the National Performance Review*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.
- Gore, A., Jr. (1994). The new job of the federal executive. *Public Administration Review*, 54(4), 317-321.
- The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-62.
- Greider, W. (1981, December). The education of David Stockman. *The Atlantic Monthly*, pp. 27-40, 43-47, 50-54.
- Grote, D. (2000). Public sector organizations: Today's innovative leaders in performance management. *Public Personnel Management*, 29(1), 1-20.
- Hendrick, R. (2000). Comprehensive management and budgeting reform in local government: The case of Milwaukee. *Public Productivity & Management Review*, 23(3), 312-337.
- Herzberg, F., Mausner, B., & Snyderman, B. B. (1993). *The motivation to work* (Rev. ed.). New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishing.
- Holloway, J. A., Francis, G. A. J., & Hinton, C. M. (1999). A vehicle for change? A case study of performance improvement in the "new" public sector. *International Journal of Public Sector Management*, 12(4), 351-365.
- Julnes, P. de L., & Holzer, M. (2001). Promoting the utilization of performance measures in public organizations: An empirical study of factors affecting adoption and implementation. *Public Administration Review*, 61(6), 693-708.
- Karmen, A. (2000). *New York murder mystery: The true story behind the crime crash of the 1990s*. New York: New York University Press.
- Kaufman, H. (1977). *Red tape: Its origins, uses, and abuses*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
- Kerr, S. (1975). On the folly of rewarding A, while hoping for B. *Academy of Management Journal*, 18(4), 769-783.

- Kettl, D. F. (1997). The global revolution in public management: Driving themes, missing links. *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management*, 16(3), 446-462.
- Kettl, D. F. (2000). *The global public management revolution: A report on the transformation of governance*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
- Lindblom, C. E. (1959). The science of "muddling through." *Public Administration Review*, 19(1), 79-88.
- Liner, B., Hatry, H. P., Vinson, E., Allen, R., Dusenbury, P., Bryant, S., et al. (2001). *Making results-based state government work*. Washington, DC: The Urban Institute.
- Maple, J. (with Mitchell, C.). (1999). *The crime fighter: How you can make your community crime-free*. New York: Doubleday.
- Marshall, N. (1998). Pay-for-performance systems: Experiences in Australia. *Public Productivity & Management Review*, 21(4), 403-418.
- Maslow, A. H. (1998). *Maslow on management*. New York: John Wiley.
- Melkers, J. E., & Willoughby, K. G. (2001). Budgeters' views of state performance-budgeting systems: Distinctions across branches. *Public Administration Review*, 61(1), 54-64.
- Miller, J. (with Gerth, J., & Natta, D. V., Jr.). (2001, December 30). Many say U. S. planned for terror but failed to take action. *New York Times*, p. A1.
- Moe, R. C. (1994). The "reinventing government" exercise: Misinterpreting the problem, misjudging the consequences. *Public Administration Review*, 54(2), 111-122.
- Moe, R. C., & Gilmour, R. S. (1995). Rediscovering the principles of public administration: The neglected foundation of public law. *Public Administration Review*, 55(2), 135-146.
- Moore, M. H. (1995). *Creating public value: Strategic management in government*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Moore, M. H., Kelling, G. W., & Wycoff, M. A. (1995, July). *Organizational change and leadership: Conditions and strategies for creating a culture of community policing*. Proposal submitted to the National Institute of Justice.
- Murray, M. (2001, September 5). Why Jack Welch's brand of leadership matters. *Wall Street Journal*, pp. B1, B10.
- O'Connell, P. E. (2001). *Using performance data for accountability: The New York City police department's CompStat model of police management*. Arlington, VA: PricewaterhouseCoopers Endowment for the Business of Government.
- Office of Management and Budget. (2001). *The president's management agenda*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.
- Osborne, D., & Gaebler, T. (1992). *Reinventing government*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
- Palguta, J. M. (2001, August). Performance appraisals are not performance management. *Issues of Merit*, pp. 1-2.
- Peters, B. G. (1996). *The future of governing: Four emerging models*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Pollitt, C. (1999). *Integrating financial management and performance management*. Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.
- Popovitch, M. G. (Ed.). (1998). *Creating high-performance government organizations: Practical guide for public managers*. Washington, DC: National Academy of Public Administration.
- Pressman, J. L., & Wildavsky, A. B. (1973). *Implementation*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Savoie, D. J. (1995). What is wrong with the new public management? *Canadian Public Administration*, 38(1), 112-121.
- Schelling, T. C. (1978). *Micromotives and macrobehavior*. New York: Norton.
- Silverman, E. B. (1999). *NYPD battles crime: Innovative strategies in policing*. Boston: Northeastern University Press.
- Simon, H. A. (1997). *Administrative behavior* (4th ed.). New York: Free Press.
- Smith, P. (1995). On the unintended consequences of publishing performance data in the public sector. *International Journal of Public Administration*, 18(2/3), 277-310.
- Stevens, L. N., & Steinhoff, J. C. (1998). *Managing for results: The statutory framework for performance-based management and accountability* (GAO/GGD/AIMD-98-52). Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office.
- Swindell, D., & Kelly, J. M. (2000). Linking citizen satisfaction data to performance measures. *Public Performance & Management Review*, 24(1), 30-52.

- Thompson, J. R. (2000). The dual potentialities of performance measurement: The case of the Social Security Administration. *Public Productivity & Management Review*, 23(3), 267-281.
- Tolbert, P. S., & Zucker, L. G. (1983). Institutional sources of change in the formal structure of organizations: The diffusion of civil service reform, 1880-1935. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 28(1), 22-39.
- Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1973). Availability: A heuristic for judging frequency and probability. *Cognitive Psychology*, 4, 207-232.
- Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974, September 27). Judgments under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. *Science*, 185(4157), 1124-1131.
- Wechsler, B., & Clary, B. (2000). Implementing performance government: A symposium introduction. *Public Productivity & Management Review*, 23(3), 264-266.
- Weick, K. E. (1979). *The social psychology of organizing* (2nd ed.). New York: Random House.
- Weick, K. E. (1984). Small wins: Redefining the scale of social problems. *American Psychologist*, 39(1), 40-49.
- Wholey, J. S. (1999). Performance-based management: Responding to the challenges. *Public Productivity & Management Review*, 22(3), 288-308.

*Robert D. Behn is a lecturer at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government and faculty chair of its executive program "Driving Government Performance: Leadership Strategies that Produce Results." He focuses his research on governance, leadership, and the management of large public agencies, with a particular emphasis on strategies for improving performance. His books include Leadership Counts: Lessons for Public Managers (Harvard University Press, 1991) and Rethinking Democratic Accountability (Brookings Institution Press, 2001). He notes that this article fully explains the inability—in more than 80 years—of the Boston Red Sox to improve performance sufficiently to win the World Series. Contact: redsox@ksg.harvard.edu*